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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

KEN KNEPPER

10614

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ken Knepper, appeals from a
judgment of the District Court of Weber County, entering a conviction against the appellant for violation of Section 76-17-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended (1961), for the failure to return to the
owner leased equipment within ten days after the
expiration of the lease or rental agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with a violation of
Section 76-17-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended (1961). A motion was filed by the appellant to quash the information. The trial court, the
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge, denied the
motion to quash. Jury trial was waived (R. 7), and
the appellant was tried on the 18th day of February,
1966. Upon completion of the evidence, Judge Cowley entered a finding of guilty and on March I, 1966,
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sentenced the appellant to be committed to the Utah
State Prison for the indeterminate term provided by
law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the conviction entered by the trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts:
Mr. Don Kammeyer, the owner and manager of
Kammeyer' s Sports Store, in Weber County, testified that he buys, sells, and leases typewriters (Tr.
3 and 4). On October 30, 1964, the appellant, Ken
Knepper, executed Exhibit A, whic;h was a rental
loan agreement for a Royal standard typewriter,
Serial No. HHE-6122225. The rental was $8.00 per
month and the typewriter was valued at $140.00
(Exhibit A - Tr. 5 and 6). The appellant gave a business address at Building 95, Freeport Center, Clearfield, Utah, and a home address of 1184 So. 1000
East, Clearfield, Utah. The appellant paid the $8.00
fee on the first month's rental, but made no other
payments (Tr. 7). Approximately a week after the
expiration of the first month's rental, Mr. Kammeyer
called the appellant. The appellant said that he
would either bring $8.00 in or bring the typewriter
back. The appellant never brought the typewriter
in or paid any sum for an additional rental period
(Tr. 8). Mr. Kammeyer went to the appellant's house,
but was unable to locate the typewriter (Tr. 8). He
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tried on other occasions to get the appellant c1t
home, but was unable to locate him (Tr. 9). Mr. Kammeyer thereafter went to the Freeport Center and
found that the office area supposedly occupied by
the appellant was locked and he could not see the
typewriter (Tr. 9).
Appellant's trial was held on the 18th day of
February, 1966, and at the time of trial, the appellant
had never returned the typewriter. Mr. Kammeyer
asked the Freeport management to endeavor to find
the typewriter, and was told that it could not be
found (Tr. 17).
The appellant admitted the execution of Exhibit
A and stated that at the time he was arrested, he
was employed in Long Beach, California, on a construction project building an extension to a roller
coaster (Tr. 19). He indicated that he did not recall
the discussion with Mr. Kammeyer subsequent to
the expiration of the rental period (Tr. 20), but did
not deny that there could have been such a conversation. The appellant stated that he was a sign
painter by trade, and that the typewriter had been
used in conjunction with the promotion of a business
of sign painting which he was conducting at the
Freeport Center. The appellant admitted that the
typewriter had been kept at the home of two boys
who were associated with him in the sign painting
operation (Tr. 24). He stated that he gave the typewriter to a Danny Buckley and that it had been
placed in Richard Jensen's car. He stated that this
was around the time that his sign painting operation
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had collapsed for lack of capital. The appellant ad
mitted that he never returned the typewriter and
that he didn't contact Mr. Kammeyer. He stated that
he had told the boys to take the typewriter back
(Tr. 38). He stated that at the time he gave the typewriter to the two boys, he stated:
"Yes. I just said, 'Here. You guys are going that way.
I am going this way.'"

He stated that approximately two months after the
business closed, he left for California (Tr. 32). He admitted that he didn't tell the boys where he got the
typewriter, but stated that they "evidently knew"
(Tr. 39). The appellant presumed that Mr. Kammeyer
had contacted him after he delivered the typewriter
to Danny Buckley (Tr. 41). He did nothing thereafter
to see that the typewriter was delivered.
The appellant had been convicted of the felony
of operating a confidence game in the State of Colorado and served time in prison (Tr. 28). Neither Danny Buckley nor Richard Jensen were ever produced
as witnesses. The appellant also indicated that the
boys had stated that they were going to keep some
other equipment he had to cover their expenses.
Appellant testified he told them not to keep it but
return it to the proper owner.
Based upon the above evidence, Judge Cowley
entered a judgment of guilty.
POINT I.
(A) THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE APPELLANT'S GUILT.
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(B) THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO HAVE DENIED THE APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE AND THE APPELLANT, HAVING
GONE FORWARD AND OFFERED EVIDENCE, HAS
WAIVED ANY INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
AT THAT TIME.

The appellant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate his guilt. The primary
assault on the State's case is the contention that the
evidence did not show the requisite willfulness in
failing to return the typewriter. The appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It should be remembered that the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt
must now be viewed in a light most favorably with
the trial court's. decision. Only if it can be said that
the evidence, when so viewed would show tha.t
Judge Cowley's determination of guilt was completely unreasonable, would this court be justified in reversing the trial court's decision.
In State v. Ward, 10 U.2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959),
this court stated as to the standard of reviewing the
decision of trial courts in criminal cases:
"The rules governing the scope of review on appeal
as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict are well settled: that it is the prerogative of
the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and
to determine the facts; that the evidence will be reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; and
that if when so viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendant
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will
not be disturbed."

Section 76-17-51 Utah Code Annotated, 19531 as
amended (196 deals with embezzlements by bailees/ tenants or attorneys in fact. The law was last
amended in 196L Laws of Utah 196L Chapter 1761
Section 1. The pertinent part of the statute applicable
to the instant case now reads:

n

"Every person who has leased or rented a motor
vehicle, trailer, appliance, tool or other valuable
thing, and who willfully fails to return the same to
its owner within ten days after the lease or rental
agreement has expired, is guilty of embezzlement."

It is apparent that the elements of the offense are
the leasing of valuable property and the willful
failure to return the same to its owner within ten
days after the expiration of the lease or rental agreement. The appellant's principal challenge is that the
willfulness of his actions in failing to return the property to Mr. Kammeyer is not established by the ev~
dence. The gist of the appellant's argument seems
to be that willfulness requires something more than
what the evidence on appeal demonstrates. It is submitted that the appellant's position starts from an
erroneous premise.
Section 76-1-3(1)/ Utah Code Annotated 1 19531
defines the use of the term "willfully" when used in
the penal code as follows:
"(1) The term 'willfully,' when applied to the intent
with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply
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a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make
the omission referred to. It does not require any
intent to violate law or to injure another or to acquire any advantage."

The appellant contends that this definition is meaningless, and that what should actually be required
is the standard imposed in the case of United States
v. Murdock. 290 U.S. 399 (1933), quoted on page 12
of appellant's brief, that the action be done "with a
particular purpose . . . without justifiable excuse
... stubbornly, obstinately, perversely.. .. "The appellant's contention that this standard should be imposed is directly contrary to the plain meaning of
the statutory definition set forth in Section 76-1-3,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The last sentence of
the definition of the term "willfully," above quoted,
indicates that there need not be any intent to violate the law or to act in a malicious manner.
In State v. Roedl. 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741
(1945), this court expressly indicated that the use of
a statutory definition in instructing the jury was not
error, apparently feeling that the language was sufficiently clear that no jury could mistake the required finding. The language in the definition part
of the Utah statute is, for the most part, directly contrary to the cases that the appellant urges this court
to follow in requiring a showing of some intent towards a deliberate wrongdoing.
Courts have long got awa_y from the standard
of willfulness that the appellant now seeks to press
upon this court. In People v. Faber, 29 Cal.App.2d
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751, 77 P.2d 921, the California court stated:
"There is, of course, no doubt that 'the word "willfully" as used in the criminal law, implies simply the
purpose or willingness to commit the unlawful act.'
People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California
Protective Corporation, 76 Cal. App. 354, 363, 244
P. 1089, 1092. It does not necessarily imply any
specific intent to violate law or to injure another and,
where specific intent is not part of the definition of
the crime, such intent as is required to make out the
crime is conclusively presumed from the intentional
performance of the act denounced though the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the
law.''

At common law, there was some confusion as to
the mental element required in a crime. There were
distinctions drawn between criminal intent and
malice which necessarily confused the- intent that
would be required for particular offenses. See l
Burdick, Law of Crime, Sections 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 117, and 122.
A careful analysis of the development of the
concept of mens rea is set forth in Hall, General
Principals of Criminal Law, 2d Ed., Chapter 3, page
70. At page 104, in summarizing the conclusions, it
is stated:
"In sum: ( 1) the professional literature, especially
beginning with Hale, distinguished mens rea from
motive. Mans rea, a fusion of cognition and volition,
is the mental state expressed in the voluntary commission of a proscribed harm. (2) The exclusion of
motive, as not essential in mens rea, does not deny
the importance of motive in determining the culp-
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ability, ('guilt') of the defendant. Instead, the reason
for doing that is the necessity to preserve the objectivity of the principle of mens rea and the principle
of legality, i.e. to signify some degree of culpability
regardless of how good the motive was. Thus questions of motivation and mitigating circumstances are
allocated to administration which can explore such
issues thoroughly. (3) Implied in the above conclusions is that the principle of mens rea must be
given an objective ethical meaning - the premise
being that actual harms (disvalues) are proscribed.
Accordingly, neither the offender's conscience nor the
personal code of ethics of the judge or the jury can
be substituted for the ethics of the penal law. The
insistence that guilt should be personal must be interpreted to accord with the paramount value of the
objectivity of the principle of mens rea."

The fact that willfulness is merely another
means of expressing voluntary intent in the criminal
law is acknowledged in Williams, Criminal Law, 2d
Ed., The General Part, Section 16 (1961).
The model Penal Code no longer uses the terms
"willful" or "intentional", but rather, combines all
the mental elements into the standard of knowledge.
Model Penal Code, SS 2.02(2)(b), 2.02(8).
Consequently, it is apparent that the Legislature
merely intended that under the provisions of Section 76-17-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
(1961), the failure of the defendant to return leased
property within ten days of the expiration of the
lease agreement be intentional as distinct from neqligent. The statute is, itself, nothing more than a
broader and more specific definition of the crim.::
of embezzlement as it existed at common law. 2
Burdick, Law of Crime, Section 575g; Clark and
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Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed., pagss 804, 807, 812.
A number of cases have recogniezd that an individual may be guilty of embezzlement by the
failure to return property in accordance with the
rental agreement. Annotation, 45 A.L.R.2d 623. Proof
of the required intent generally can only be evidenced by the words or conduct of the person
claimed to have entertained it, but, of course the
intent may be shown by the circumstances of the
case. 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Embezzlement, Section 53. The
conversion of the property is, itself, evidence of an
intent to embezzle. 26 Am. Jur.2d, Embezzlement,
Section 56.
In Chapman v. the State. 90 Okl. Crim. 224, 2l 2
P.2d 485 (1949), the defendant was convicted of
larceny of a rented automobile by fraud. The Oklahoma court acknowledged that the -intent to commit
the larceny by fraud could be shown by circumstantial evidence. The defendant was tried by trial
court without jury. The court stated:
"But the question of intent to commit larceny is a
question of fact to be determined by the jury under
the circumstances and the evidence."

The court found that the evidence was sufficient to
show the required intent. The facts in that case bectr
resemblance to those in the instant case.
The facts in the instant case clearly support the
trial court's verdict. There was no question but what
the appellant signed the rental loan agreement,
paid only one month's rent, and did not return the
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property within ten days after the termination of the
rental agreement. Within a week after the expiration of the rental agreement and before the ten days
had expired, the appellant was contacted by Mr.
Kammeyer on the telephone and advised to either
return the property or make another rental payment. The appellant said that he would do so the
next Monday. He did not do so. The appellant clearly was awa.re of his obligation to see that the rent::1l
was paid on the property rented. The appellant's
testimony (a convicted felon) was to the effect that
he advised Mr. Danny Buckley to return the property but did not tell him where to return the property, and apparently did not turn the property over
to Danny, as indicated in the appellant's brief, until
after the ten-day period had expired (appellant's
brief, page 8 - Tr. 32, 37). The appellant never made
inquiry from Mr. Ka_mmeyer as to whether the ma.chine had beeri returned and left for California. The
appellant was also aware that the boys who had
been working for him were claiming interest in his
property for the value of their services and investment.
Based on this evidence, it was well within the
trial court's prerogative to find the appellant guilty.
The appellant contends that the trial court
should have dismissed the case at the end of the
State's evidence. The respondent submits that there
is no merit to that contention that the evidence did
not make out a prima fade case at the time the State
rested. However, even assuming for the sake of argument, that the trial court erred, the appellant did
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rely upon the State's evidence alone, but went fo~
ward with his own evidence, and the appellant, himself, made admissions on the stand which tended to
impeach his credibility and support the conclusion
that he was guilty of the offense. Consequently, the
appellant waived any claim of error for the trial
court's failure to dismiss at the end of the State's
case.
In Wigmore, Evidence, Section 2496, it is stated:
"Conversely, however, he cannot take advantage of
the judge's original erroneous refusal to direct a verdict for insufficiency at the time of the first motion,
(a) if he does not renew the motion at the close of
all the evidence, or (h) or if at the time of the final
motion the ruling correctly refuses to order a verdict
for insufficiency; for the Court is at that time entitled to decide upon a survey of the whole evidence;
and this survey naturally renders any prior er;:or
immaterial. ':' * *"

In State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 511, 178 S.W.2d 449
(1944), the court said:
"Since appellant did not stand on it (first demurrer)
but presented evidence in his own behalf, the trial
court was bound to take the latter evidence into consideration insofar as it helped the State's case, in
ruling on the second demurrer at the close of the
whole case."

Since the appellant chose to go forward in this
case, the only question is whether the evidence at
the end of the State's case was sufficient to establish
the appellant's guilt. Since it was, there is no merit
to the appellant's contention on appeal.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S WILLFUL FAILURE TO RETURN
A LEASED TYPEWRITER IS A CRIME ENCOMPASSED WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 76-17-5,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED (1961).

The appellant's final contention is that his failure to return the leased typewriter is not encompassed within the provisions of Section 76-17-5, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended by Laws of Utah
1961, Chapter 176, Section 1. The appellant's contention is based upon the theory of ejusdem generis.
In effect, the appellant contends that since motor vehicles, trailers, appliances, equipment, and tools are
mentioned specifically that a typewriter is not encompassed within the language "or other valuable
thing." Appellant also relies upon the maxim of
noscitur a sociss, which is somewhat broader than
the theory of ejusdem generis in that it means generally that general and specific words which are
capc.~ble of analogous meaning, being associated together, take color from each other so that the general words are restricted to a sense, analogous to
the less general. Townsend v. State. 63 Fla. 46, .57
So. 611. However, it is submitted that there is no
merit b the appellant's contention. The very language of the statute. itself, evidences a legislative
intent to encompass items of a valuable nature
which may be the subject of lease or rental agreements. There is no continuity of class in the words
"motor vehicle, traller, appliance, equipment, er
tool." Under such circumstances, it is well estab-
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lished that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is net
applicable.
In Sutherla.nd, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed ..
Volume 2, Section 4910, it is stated:
"The doctrine applies when the following conditions
exist: ( 1) the statute contains an enumeration by
specific words; (2) the members of the enumeration
constitute a class; (3) the class is not exhausted by
the enumeration; ( 4) a general term follows the
enumeration; and ( 5) there is not clearly manifested
an intent that the general term be given a broader
meaning than the doctrine requires.
A 'class' is an artificial creation to provide ease in
dealing with numerous items with similar characteristics. Thus, 'a class' is a generalization which accurately or inaccurately associates items for a particular purpose or treatment. Vvithout some objective or purpose classification is impossible. Consequestly, the rule of ejusdem generis depending as it
does on pme form provides a dangerous yardstick
with which to r.1easure the statutory coverage which
the legislature intended."

Further, Sutherland, supra, Section 4912, no:.es tho.+
if there is no reasonable enumeration attempted bv
the Legislature, or the terms used by the language
are themselves broad, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not applicable.
In Higler v. People, 44 Mich. 299, 6 N.W. Ge~
(1880), the Michigan Supreme Court noted that a
statute making criminal certain forms of cheats and
frauds or by means of "any false trust or writing c,r
by any other false pretense," was in itself so general
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and without classification as to render the doctrine
of ejusdem generis inapplicable.
A similar result was reached in Jones v. State.
104 Ark. 261, 149 S.W. 56 (1912), where the court
found that a statute relating to suspension from oifice of certain public officials involved terms so entirely unalike and antagonistic in meaning as to re;:-1der the doctrine of ejusdem generis inapplicable.
Further, Sutherland, supra, Section 4914, also notes:
"A final qualification on the doctrine is that the
general words are not restricted in meaning to objects
ejusdem generis if there is a clear manifestation of a
contrary intent."

This court has had occasion to recognize the
above mentioned limitation on the doctrine of
ejusdem generis. in Nephi Plaster and Manufacturing Company v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 Pac.
53. In that case, an action was brought to recover a
tax imposed upon gymsum obtained from a mine,
where the applicable language imposed a tax on "all
mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in
pbce, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper,
lead, coal, or other valuable mineral deposits***"
Constitution of the State of Utah, Section 4, Article
XIII, January 4, 1896. This court rejected the contention that the doctrine of ejusdem generis was applicable and stated:
"We think that it is reasonably clear, that the phrase
'or other valuable mineral deposits,' was not intended
to contain minerals only ejusdem generis with the
metals specially named, but that it was intended that

16
all mineral deposits should be taxed in this way, and
not only metalliferous minerals and coal.
In adopting this construction, we think we are sustained by the authorities. In speaking of the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 279, says:
'It (the doctrine) affords a mere suggestion
to the judicial mind that, where it clearly appears that the lawmaker was thinking of a particular class of persons or subjects, his words of
more general description may not have been intended to embrace any other than those within
the class. The suggestion is one of common
sense. Other rules of construction are equally
potent, especially the primary rule which suggests that the intent of the Legislature is to be
found in the ordinary meaning of the words of
the statute. The sense in which general words, or
any words, are intended to be used, furnishes the
rule of interpretation, and this is to be collected
from the context; and a narrower or more extended meaning will be given, according as the
i'1tmtion is thus indicated. To deny any word
or phrase its known and natural meaning in any
instance, the court ought to be quite sure that
they are following the legislative intention.
Hence, though a general term follows specific
words, it will not be restricted by them when the
object of the act and the intention is that the
general word shall be understood in its ordinary
sense.'

The foregoing test is well illustrated and supported
by a great number of decisions, among which are the
following well-considered cases: Woodworth v. State,
26 Ohio St. 196; Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala. 687; State
vs. Solomon, 33 Ind. 450; Tisdell v. Comb, 7 A. & E.
(Ewlish Common Law) 223, 788.
'The doctrine of ejusdem generis is but a rule of
construction,' says the Supreme Court of Min-
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is intended 'to aid in the ascertaining the meaning of the Legislature, and does not
w:taant a court in confining the operation of a
:-;'.-.atutc within narrower limits than intended by
the lawmakers. The general object of an act
sometimes requires that the final general term
shall not be restricted in meaning by its more
specific predecessors.' (Willis v. Mabon, 48
Minn. 140, 50 N.W. 1110, 16 L.R.A. 281, 31
Arn. St. Rep. 626.)
nE:,o~a, ~nd

The following cases are to the same effect: Webber
v. Chicago, 148 Ill. 313, 36 N.E. 70; Lent v. Portland,
42 Ore. 488, 71 Pac. 645. The foregoing statement, it
seems to us, is most pertinent with regard to the
meaning to be given to the phrase 'or other valuable
mineral deposits.' To restrict this phrase so as to include no more than metalliferous deposits would, in
view of what we have said about the production of
c12tals in this state, practically rob the phrase of any
meaning whatever. It would simply eliminate from
consideration all other nonmetallic valuable mineral
deposits of this state, of which there are a great number. To do this, as we read the constitutional provision, was manifestly not the intention of the framers
thereof, nor do we think that such was the intent that
the people had of it when they adopted the Constitution."

In Salt Lake City v. Doran. 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac.
636 (1913), this court again was called upon to apply
the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The court was construing Compiled Laws of Utah 1907, Section 4261,
as amended Laws of Utah 1911, page 265, prohibiting certain gambling activities. A large number of
games were mentioned as being illegal, followed
by the phrase "or any game played with cards, dice,
or any other device***." The court ruled that ejusdem generis was not applicable, stating:
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"In our judgment the legislature, in adding the phrase
in italics, clearly intended to cover and include any
and all other games played with cards, in whatever
form the cards should be used, and also all other
devices where the use thereof amounted to gambling
as that term is popularly understood. We had occasion to discuss somewhat at length the application
of the doctrine or maxim of ejusdem generis in the
case of Plaster :Mfg, Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah
124, 126, 93 Pac. 57, 58. We there pointed out that
the doctrine is but a rule of construction to aid courts
in ascertaining the meaning and to prevent their
transcending the intention of the legislature when
using general terms following particular ones in the
enactment of laws. It is there held, in effect, that,
when the meaning or intention of the lawmaker is
clear, the doctrine cannot be applied for the purpose
of narrowing or limiting the meaning of a word or
phrase so as to defeat the legislative intent. We cannot, nor is it now necessary, to add anything to what
is said upon the subject in the case referred to. It
must suffice to say that it is as clear in this case as
it was in that that the doctrine has no application."

In the instant case, it is clear from the fact that
there is no continuity of classification in the items
set forth in the statute, and by the additional fact
that the enumeration of items is, itself, general, that
the Legislature did not intend the statute to be
limited to any particular type of equipment, tool, or
instrument. Any valuable thing which was the subject of a personal property lease or rental was intended to be encompassed by the statute. Indeed,
a typewriter could well fit within the term "equipment," since, according to the testimony of the ap-
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pellant, the typewriter was to be used in conjunction with his business. m
In United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950), the
Supreme Court of the United States was concerned
with the question of whether phonograph records
were included within a statute prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of any "obscene ***
book, pamphlet, picture, motion picture film, paper,
letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent
character." The United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, applying the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, (175 F.2d 137, 9th Cir. 1949):
"When properly applied, the rule of ejusdem generis
is a useful canon of construction. But it is to be resorted to not to obscure and defeat the intent and
purpose of Congress, but to elucidate its words and
effectuate its intent. It cannot be employed to render
general words meaningless. Mason v. United States,
260 U.S. 545, 554, 43 S.Ct. 200, 202, 67 L.Ed. 396.
What is or is not a proper case for application of the
rule was discussed in Gooch v. United States, 297
U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 396, 80 L.Ed. 522. In that case
a bandit and a companion had kidnapped two police
officers for the purpose of avoiding arrest and had
transported the.m across a state line. The defendant
was convicted of kiddnapping under a federal statute
which made it an offense to transport across state
lines any person who had been kidnapped 'and held
for ransom or reward or otherwise.' The police officers
had been held not for ransom or reward but for protection, and it was contended that the words 'or oth(1)

This would be in accord with the definition of "equipment" under the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Section 70A-7-109(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Supplement.
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erwise' did not cover the defendant's conduct, since
under the rule of ejusdem generis, the general phrase
was limited in meaning to some kind of monetary
reward. This Court rejected such limiting application of the rule, saying: 'The rule of ejusdem generis,
while firmly established, is only an instrumentality
for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when
there is uncertainty. Ordinarily, it limits general
terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to
those specified; but it may not be used to defeat the
obvious purpose of legislation. And, while penal statutes are narrowly construed, this does not require
rejection of that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context and the end in view.' 297
U.S. at page 128, 56 S.Ct. at page 397.
We think that to apply the rule of ejusdem generis to
the present case would be 'to defeat the obvious purpose of legislation.' The obvious purpose of the legislation under consideration was to prevent the channels of interstate commerce from being used to disseminate any matter that, in its essential nature,
communicate obscene, lewd, lasciVious or filthy
ideas. * * * It will be noted that Congress legislated
with respect to a number of evils in addition to those
proscribed by the portion of the statute under which
respondent was charged. Statutes are construed in
their entire context. This is a comprehensive statute,
which should not be constricted by a mechanical rule
of construction. * * *"

Nor is there any merit to the appellant's contention that the maxim of strict construction of penal
statutes is involved. First, the statute is rather clear
on its face that willfully failing to return rented property within ten days is criminal misconduct. Further,
the statute is adequate to show a legislative intention to cover all facets of leased and rented property.
· Finally, the doctrine of limited construction of penal
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statutes has no applicability to Utah law in general.
Section 68-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:

"* * * The statutes establish the laws of this state
respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings under them are
to be liberally construed with a view to effect the
objects of the statutes and to promote justice. * * *"
This court has previously indicated that the rule
of strict construction of penal statutes is not applicable in Utah, and the same rules of statutory construction applicable in civil cases are generally applied
in criminal cases. State v. Ledkins, 303 P.2d 1099,
5 U.2d 422 (1956).
The legislative policy in enacting the statute
presently before the court was clearly to abate d
serious problem of bailees converting leased or
rented property. The actions of the appellant clearly
fall within the ambit of the statute, and the argument
that a typewriter is not encompassed within the
subjects of the statute is without merit.
CONCLUSION
The facts of the instant case amply demonstrate
the appellant's guilt. There is no basis upon which
this court could state that the evidence of the appellant's guilt was not proved at the time of trial
beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant's contention that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is somehow applicable to exclude the embezzled type-
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writer from the statute has no basis in a proper construction of the statute.
There is no legitimate basis warranting reversal
of the appellant's conviction, and this court should
affirm.
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